08 | Sankhya Material¶
This document is a transcription of a chapter on Sāṅkhya philosophy. The first page of the provided document contains the end of a previous chapter.
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is the unique Gateway to Bliss and which frightens the wrong doctrines. One who has realized this truth cannot be tainted with any defect, for defect and truth, like darkness and light, are opposed to each other. And when there is no defect and no attachment, all 'coverings' of ignorance are removed and consequently Omniscience is realized and Oneness with the Buddha is attained.¹ When the truth that Consciousness is the only reality and that ultimately there is no object (dharma-nairātmya) and no subject (pudgala-nairātmya) is realized, the cycle of birth-and-death comes to a standstill. This state is called Apavarga.²
The Merciful Buddha who is the true friend of all, has taught the right doctrine to everybody without making any distinction of any kind.³ The wise Brāhmaṇas pay their respects to the Omniscient Buddha.⁴ The real Brāhmaṇas are those who have removed all the sins by practising the teaching of Nairātmya and they are to be found in the religion founded by the Enlightened Sage.⁵ The spurious Brāhmanas, unable to defend their wrong views by means of sound arguments fall back upon the authority of the Veda. The Great Buddha, on the other hand, confident of his power to expound the right doctrine through reasonable arguments, curbing the arrogance of the maddened elephant-like opponents, fearlessly roars like a lion in the following manner:—'O Bhikṣus, accept my words not out of mere respect for me, but after testing them at the touchstone of reason, just as gold is accepted as true by the wise after heating, cutting and rubbing against the touchstone'.⁶
¹ Tattva-Saṅgraha, K. 3322, 3338-3339. ² Ibid, K. 3488, 3491, 3539, 3492-3494. ³ Ibid, K. 3589. ⁴ Ibid, K. 3512. ⁵ Ibid, K. 3569. ⁶ tāpāch chhedāch cha nikaṣāt suvarṇam iva paṇḍitaiḥ, parīkṣya bhikṣavo grāhyam mad vacho na tu gauravāt. Ibid, quoted as K. 3588.
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Chapter Nine¶
SĀNKHYA¶
I¶
INTRODUCTION¶
SĀNKHYA is undoubtedly one of the oldest systems of Indian Philosophy. We find references to the Sāṅkhya-Yoga doctrines in some of the Upaniṣads, e.g., in the Chhāndogya,¹ the Praśna,² the Kaṭha³ and particularly in the Śvetāśvatara;⁴ in the Mahābhārata;⁵ in the Gītā;⁶ and in the Smṛtis and the Purāṇas. Bādarāyaṇa, the author of the Vedānta-sūtra, repeatedly refers to the view whether the Sāṅkhya can be regarded as the teaching of the Upaniṣads and rejects it,⁷ besides undertaking refutation of the Sāṅkhya in the Tarkapāda on rational grounds. Śaṅkarāchārya regards it as the 'main opponent' (pradhāna-malla) of Vedānta and says that though Sāṅkhya and Yoga are generally accepted by the wise as conducive to the Highest Good, yet these systems advocate dualism and cannot be supported by the Śruti. These words are used in the Śruti and the Smṛti in the sense of knowledge and action respectively and words like Mahat, Avyakta etc. are used in the sense of names and forms.⁸ The fact that Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara are keen to reject the view that Sāṅkhya, though accepted by the wise, is not based on the Upaniṣads because it advocates dualism, suggests that there must have been some thinkers belonging to the Sāṅkhya who claimed it to be the teaching of the Upaniṣads. Though nothing can be said with absolute certainty, it seems highly probable that the Sāṅkhya in the beginning was based on the Upaniṣads and had accepted the theistic Absolute, but later on, under the influence of the Jaina and the Buddhist thought, it rejected theistic monism and was content with spiritualistic pluralism and atheistic realism. And it is this Sānkhya to which Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara are opposed. This also explains why some of the later Sāṅkhyas, e.g. Vijñānabhikṣu in the sixteenth century, tried to revive the earlier theism in Sāṅkhya.
Tradition regards Kapila as the founder of this system. But Sāṅkhya-pravachana-sūtra which is attributed to him is generally regarded by
¹ IV, 5, 1. ² VI, 2. ³ I, 3, 10-13. ⁴ IV, 5, 10, 12, 16; VI, 10, 13, 18. ⁵ XII, 318; Shantiparva 303-308. ⁶ II, 39; III, 42; V, 4-5. ⁷ I, 1, 5-11; II, 1, 1-3. ⁸ Śaṅkara-Bhāṣya, I, 1, 5-10; I, 4, 1-3 and 28; II, 1, 3.
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scholars as a work of the fourteenth century A.D., because it has been referred to by the earlier writers of the other schools, because it criticizes the rival systems and because it wants to revive theism. So far as theism is concerned, we maintain that the original Sāṅkhya was theistic. But the fact that this work has been ignored and Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Kārikā has been referred to instead by the other earlier writers as well as the fact that it criticizes other systems go against this view. But being regarded as that of Kapila himself, as Īśvarakṛṣṇa himself speaks of Kapila, Āsuri, and Pañchaśikha, it seems probable that these were historical personages whose works have been lost. Kapila certainly flourished before Buddha and he must have composed Sāṅkhya-sūtra which work was unfortunately lost long ago. Īśvarakṛṣṇa's Sāṅkhya-Kārikā seems to be the earliest available and the most popular work of this system. Besides this we have Gauḍapāda's Sāṅkhya-Kārikā-bhāṣya, Vāchaspati Miśra's Tattva-Kaumudī and Vijñāna-bhikṣu's Sāṅkhya-pravachana-bhāṣya.
The word 'Sāṅkhya' is derived from the word 'saṅkhyā' which means right knowledge as well as number. The Gītā uses this word in the sense of knowledge, so does the Mahābhārata at other places. Also Sāṅkhya means the philosophy of right knowledge (samyak khyāti or jñāna). The system is predominantly intellectual and theoretical. Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separateness of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti. Yoga, as the counterpart of Sāṅkhya, means action or practice and tells us how the theoretical metaphysical teachings of Sāṅkhya might be realized in actual practice. Thus Sāṅkhya-Yoga forms one complete system, the former being the theoretical while the latter being the practical aspect of the same teaching. Sāṅkhya is also the philosophy of numbers, because it deals with twenty-five categories. As a philosophy of numbers, it might have influenced the Pythagorean philosophy.
Īśvarakṛṣṇa (fifth century A.D.) is the representative of the classical Sāṅkhya which had divorced itself from the Upaniṣads under the influence of Jainism and Buddhism, yet the Vedāntic teaching of absolutism with which the original Sāṅkhya was associated, asserts itself implicitly in Īśvarakṛṣṇa. We have seen that absolutism is implicit in Jainism and explicit in Mahāyāna Buddhism and we shall see how it is implicit in Īśvarakṛṣṇa also.
Sāṅkhya maintains a clear-cut dualism between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and further maintains the plurality of the Puruṣas, and is silent on God. It is a pluralistic spiritualism and an atheistic realism and an uncompromising dualism.
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II¶
THEORY OF CAUSATION¶
LET us first consider the Sāṅkhya theory of causation on which its doctrine of Prakṛti is based. The basic question involved in any theory of causation is: Does the effect pre-exist in its material cause? Those who answer this question in the negative are called Asatkāryavādins, while those who answer it in the affirmative are called Satkāryavādins. According to the former, the effect is a new creation, a real beginning. The effect (kārya) does not pre-exist (asat) in its material cause. Otherwise, there would be no sense in saying that it is produced or caused. If the pot already exists in the clay and the cloth in the threads and curd in milk, then why should the potter exert himself in producing the pot out of the clay, and why should not the threads serve the purpose of the cloth and why should not milk taste like curd? Moreover, its production would be its repeated birth which is nonsense. Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Hīnayāna Buddhism, Materialism and some followers of Mīmāṃsā believe in Asatkāryavāda, which is also known as Ārambhavāda, i.e., the view that production is a new beginning. Materialism believes in Svabhāvavāda; Hīnayāna Buddhism in Anitya-paramāṇuvāda or Kṣaṇabhaṅgavāda and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and some followers of Mīmāṃsā in Nitya-parāmāṇu-kāraṇavāda. The Satkāryavādins, on the other hand, believe that the effect is not a new creation, but only an explicit manifestation of that which was implicitly contained in its material cause. Here, another important question arises: Is the effect a real transformation or an unreal appearance of its cause? Those who believe that the effect is a real transformation of its cause are called Pariṇāmavādins (pariṇāma = real modification); while those who believe that it is an unreal appearance are called Vivartavādins (vivarta = unreal appearance). Sāṅkhya, Yoga and Rāmānuja believe in Pariṇāmavāda. The view of Sāṅkhya-Yoga is called Prakṛti-pariṇāma-vāda, while the view of Rāmānuja is called Brahma-pariṇāmavāda. Śūnyavāda, Vijñānavāda and Śaṅkara believe in Vivartavāda. Their views may be respectively called Śūnyatā-vivarta-vādā, Vijñāna-vivarta-vāda and Brahma-vivarta-vāda. The view of Jainism and of Kumārila may be called Sadasatkāryavāda because according to them the effect is both real as well as unreal before its production—real as identical with the cause and unreal as a modal change thereof, though ultimately both incline towards Pariṇāmavāda.
Sāṅkhya believes in Satkāryavāda. All material effects are the modification (pariṇāma) of Prakṛti. They pre-exist in the eternal bosom
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of Prakṛti and simply come out of it at the time of creation and return to it at the time of dissolution. There is neither new production nor utter destruction. Production means development or manifestation (āvir-bhāva); destruction means envelopment or dissolution (tirobhāva). Production is evolution; destruction is involution. Sāṅkhya gives five arguments in support of Satkāryavāda:
(1) If the effect does not pre-exist in its cause, it becomes a mere nonentity like the hare's horn or the sky-flower and can never be produced (asadakaranāt). (2) The effect is only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with it (upādānagrahaṇāt). (3) Everything cannot be produced out of everything. This suggests that the effect, before its manifestation, is implicit in its material cause (sarvasambhavābhāvāt). (4) Only an efficient cause can produce that for which it is potent. This again means that the effect, before its manifestation, is potentially contained in its material cause. Production is only an actualization of the potential (śaktasya śakya-karaṇāt). Were it not so, then curd should be produced out of water, and cloth out of reeds, and, oil out of sand-particles. (5) The effect is the essence of its material cause and as such identical with it. When the obstructions in the way of manifestation are removed, the effect naturally flows out of its cause. The cause and the effect are the implicit and the explicit stages of the same process. The cloth is contained in the threads, the oil in the oil-seeds, the curd in the milk. The effect pre-exists in its material cause (kāraṇabhāvāt).¹
III¶
PRAKṚTI¶
THE theory that causation means a real transformation of the material cause leads to the concept of Prakṛti as the root-cause of the world of objects. All worldly effects are latent in this uncaused cause, because infinite regress has to be avoided. It is the potentiality of nature, 'the receptacle and nurse of all generation'. As the uncaused root-cause, it is called Prakṛti; as the first principle of this Universe, it is called Pradhāna; as the unmanifested state of all effects, it is known as Avyakta;
¹ asadakaraṇād upādānagrahaṇāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt. śaktasya śakyakaraṇāt kāraṇabhāvāchcha satkāryam. Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, 9.
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as the extremely subtle and imperceptible thing which is only inferred from its products, it is called Anumāna; as the unintelligent and unconscious principle, it is called Jaḍa; and as the ever-active unlimited power, it is called Śakti. The products are caused, dependent, relative, many and temporary as they are subject to birth and death or to production and destruction; but Prakṛti is uncaused, independent, absolute, one and eternal, being beyond production and destruction. The extreme subtleness of Prakṛti makes it unmanifest and imperceptible; we infer its existence through its products. Motion is inherent in it in the form of Rajas. As the source of the inanimate world, it is unconscious. The entire world of objects is implicit in the bosom of Prakṛti. Evolution is the explicit manifestation of this world of objects, while dissolution is the returning of this world to Prakṛti. Sāṅkhya believes that consciousness cannot be regarded as the source of the inanimate world, as Vedānta and Mahāyāna believe, because an intelligent principle cannot transform itself into the unintelligent world. On the other hand, the material atoms of the physical elements too cannot be regarded as the cause of this world, as Chārvākas, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Jainism and Hīnayāna Buddhism, and Mīmāṃsā wrongly believe, because they cannot explain the subtle products of matter like intellect, mind and ego (these are different from pure consciousness which belongs to Puruṣa alone, and are regarded here as internal organs), and further because the unity of the universe points to a single cause while the atoms are scattered and many. Unintelligent, unmanifest, uncaused, ever-active, imperceptible, eternal and one Prakṛti alone is the final source of this world of objects which is implicitly and potentially contained in its bosom.
Sāṅkhya gives five proofs for the existence of Prakṛti which are as follows:
(1) All individual things in this world are limited, dependent, conditional and finite. The finite cannot be the cause of the universe. Logically we have to proceed from the finite to the infinite, from the limited to the unlimited, from the peros to the aperos, from the temporary to the permanent, from the many to the one. And it is this infinite, unlimited, eternal and all-pervading Prakṛti which is the source of this universe (bhedānāṁ parimāṇāt). (2) All worldly things possess certain common characteristics by which they are capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. Hence there must be a common source composed of three Guṇas, from which all worldly things arise (samanvayāt). (3) All effects arise from the activity of the potent cause. Evolution means the manifestation of the hitherto implicit as the
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explicit. The activity which generates evolution must be inherent in the world-cause. And this cause is Prakṛti (kāryataḥ pravṛtteścha). (4) The effect differs from the cause and hence the limited effect cannot be regarded as its own cause. The effect is the explicit and the cause is the implicit state of the same process. The effects, therefore, point to a world-cause where they are potentially contained (kāraṇakāryavibhāgāt). (5) The unity of the universe points to a single cause. And this cause is Prakṛti. (avibhāgāt vaiśvarūpyasya).¹
Prakṛti is said to be the unity of the three Guṇas held in equilibrium (guṇānāṁ sāmyāvasthā). The three Guṇas are Sattva, Rajas and Tamas. They are the constituents of Prakṛti and through it of the worldly objects. Being subtle and imperceptible their existence is inferred from their effects—pleasure, pain and indifference respectively. Although they are called Guṇas, yet they are not ordinary qualities or attributes like the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Guṇas. They themselves possess qualities like lightness, activity, heaviness etc. They are extremely fine and ever-changing elements. They make up Prakṛti which is nothing apart from them. They are not the qualities which Prakṛti, the substance, possesses; on the other hand they themselves constitute Prakṛti. They are the factors or the constituents or the elements of Prakṛti. They are called Guṇas² because they are the elements of Prakṛti which alone is called substantive; or because they are subservient to the end of the Puruṣa, or because they are intertwined, like three strands, to make up the rope of Prakṛti which binds the Puruṣas.
Sattva literally means real or existent and is responsible for the manifestation of objects in consciousness. It is called goodness and produces pleasure. It is light and bright, buoyant (laghu) and illuminating (prakāśaka). Luminosity of light, power of reflection, upward movement, pleasure, happiness, contentment, bliss are all due to it. Its colour is white. Rajas, which literally means foulness, is the principle of motion. It produces pain. Restless activity, feverish effort and wild stimulation are its results. It is mobile (chala) and stimulating (upaṣṭambhaka). Its colour is red. Tamas, which literally means darkness, is the principle of inertia. It produces apathy and indifference. Ignorance, sloth, confusion, bewilderment, passivity and negativity are its results. It is heavy (guru) and enveloping (varaṇaka) and as such is opposed to Sattva. It is also opposed to Rajas as it arrests activity. Its colour is dark. These three guṇas which constitute Prakṛti are never separate. They
¹ bhedānāṁ parimāṇāt samanvayāt kāryataḥ pravṛtteścha. kāraṇakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya, Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, 15. ² Guṇa means 'quality', 'secondary' and 'strand of a rope'.
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conflict and yet co-operate with one another and are always found intermingled. They are compared to the oil, the wick and the flame of a lamp, which, though opposed, yet co-operate to produce the light of a lamp. They are imperceptible and are inferred from their effects. All things are composed of these three guṇas and their differences are due to the different combinations of these guṇas. The nature of a thing is determined by the preponderance of a particular guṇa. Things are called good, bad or indifferent; intelligent, active or slothful; pure, impure or neutral, on account of the predominance of sattva, rajas or tamas respectively. When these guṇas are held in a state of equilibrium, that state is called Prakṛti. Evolution of worldly objects does not take place at this state. These guṇas are said to be ever-changing. They cannot remain static even for a moment. Change is said to be of two kinds—homogeneous or sarūpa-pariṇāma and heterogeneous or virūpa-pariṇāma. During the state of dissolution (pralaya) of the world, the guṇas change homogeneously, i.e., sattva changes into sattva, rajas into rajas and tamas into tamas. This change does not disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas and unless the equilibrium is disturbed and one predominates over the other two, evolution cannot take place. Evolution starts when there is heterogeneous change in the guṇas and one predominates over the other two and brings about terrific commotion in the bosom of Prakṛti.
The nature of these guṇas is beautifully brought out in a Hindi couplet by Rasalina. The poet says that the eyes of the beloved are white, red and dark, and are full of nectar, intoxication and poison, with the result that once they pierce the heart of the lover, he experiences the joy of life, the agony of restlessness and the inertia of death. The recollection of the beloved gives him joy and makes life worth living; separation causes acute pain and makes him restless; intensity of love makes him forget everything and become inactive, unconscious and almost dead.¹ Sattva is white and is like nectar and gives joy; rajas is red and is like intoxication and gives pain; tamas is dark and is like poison and produces unconsciousness. 'We bow to Prakṛti,' says Īśvarakṛṣṇa, 'the red-white-dark, the unborn mother and “nurse and receptacle of all generation”.'² Such is the conception of Prakṛti in Sāṅkhya.
IV¶
PURUṢA¶
THE other of the two co-present co-eternal realities of Sāṅkhya is the Puruṣa, the principal of pure Consciousness. Puruṣa is the soul, the self, the spirit, the subject, the knower. It is neither body nor senses nor
¹ amī-halāhala-mada-bhare śveta-śyāma-ratanāra. jiyata, marata, jhuki jhuki parata, jehi chitavata ika bāra. ² ajāmekāṁ lohita-śukla-kṛṣṇāṁ bahvīḥ prajāḥ sṛjamānāṁ namāmaḥ.
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brain nor mind (manas) nor ego (ahaṅkāra) nor intellect (buddhi). It is not a substance which possesses the quality of Consciousness. Consciousness is its essence. It is itself pure and transcendental Consciousness. It is the ultimate knower which is the foundation of all knowledge. It is the pure subject and as such can never become an object of knowledge. It is the silent witness, the emancipated alone, the neutral seer, the peaceful eternal. It is beyond time and space, beyond change and activity. It is self-luminous and self-proved. It is uncaused, eternal and all-pervading. It is the indubitable real, the postulate of knowledge, and all doubts and denials pre-suppose its existence. It is called nistraiguṇya, udāsīnā, akartā, kevala, madhyastha, sākṣī, draṣṭā, sadāprakāśasvarūpa, and jñāta.¹
Sāṅkhya gives the following five proofs for the existence of the Puruṣa:
(1) All compound objects exist for the sake of the Puruṣa. The body, the senses, the mind and the intellect are all means to realize the end of the Puruṣa. The three guṇas, the Prakṛti, the subtle body—all are said to serve the purpose of the self. Evolution is teleological or purposive. Prakṛti evolves itself in order to serve the Puruṣa's end. This proof is teleological (saṅghātaparārthatvāt). (2) All objects are composed of the three guṇas and therefore logically presuppose the existence of the Puruṣa who is the witness of these guṇas and is himself beyond them. The three guṇas imply the conception of a nistraiguṇya—that which is beyond them. This proof is logical (triguṇādiviparyayāt). (3) There must be a transcendental synthetic unity of pure Consciousness to co-ordinate all experiences. All knowledge necessarily presupposes the existence of the self. The self is the foundation (adhiṣṭhāna), the fundamental postulate of all empirical knowledge. All affirmations and all negations equally presuppose it. Without it, experience would not become experience. This proof is ontological (adhiṣṭhānāt). (4) Non-intelligent Prakṛti cannot experience its products. So there must be an intelligent principle to experience the worldly products of Prakṛti. Prakṛti is the enjoyed (bhogyā) and so there must be an enjoyer (bhoktā). All objects of the world have the characteristics of producing pleasure, pain and bewilderment. But pleasure, pain and bewilderment have meaning only when there is a conscious principle to
¹ tasmāchcha viparyāsāt siddhaṁ sākṣitvam asya puruṣasya. kaivalyam mādhyastham dṛṣṭṛtvam akartṛbhāvaścha, Sāṅkhya-Kārikā, 19.
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experience them. Hence Puruṣa must exist. This argument is ethical (bhoktṛbhāvāt). (5) There are persons who try to attain release from the sufferings of the world. The desire for liberation and emancipation implies the existence of a person who can try for and obtain liberation. Aspiration presupposes the aspirant. This proof is mystical or religious (kaivalyārtham pravṛtteḥ).²
Unlike Advaita Vedānta and like Jainism and Mīmāṃsā, Sāṅkhya believes in the plurality of the Puruṣas. Like the Jīvas of the Jainas, the souls of Rāmānuja and the monads of Leibnitz, the Sāṅkhya Puruṣas are subject to qualitative monism and quantitative pluralism. The selves are all essentially alike; only numerically are they different. Their essence is consciousness. Bliss is regarded as different from consciousness and is the product of the sattvaguṇa. Sāṅkhya gives the following three arguments for proving the plurality of the Puruṣas:
(i) The souls have different sensory and motor organs and undergo separate births and deaths. Had there been only one Puruṣa, the birth or death of one should have meant the birth or death of all and any particular experience of pleasure, pain or indifference by one should have been equally shared by all. Hence the souls must be many. (ii) If the self were one, bondage of one should have meant bondage of all and liberation of one should have meant liberation of all. The activity of one should have made all persons active and the sleep of one should have lulled into sleep all other persons. (iii) Though the emancipated souls are all alike and differ only in number as they are all beyond the three guṇas, yet the bound souls relatively differ in qualities also, since in some sattva predominates, while in others rajas, and in still others tamas. Hence their difference.
V¶
EVOLUTION¶
We have seen that Prakṛti is regarded as essentially dynamic. If motion were not inherent in Prakṛti, it could not be given to it by any outside agency; and if motion once ceased in Prakṛti, it could not reappear. Hence Prakṛti is always changing.³ Even in dissolution, there is
² saṅghātaparārthatvāt triguṇādiviparyayād adhiṣṭhānāt. puruṣo'sti bhoktṛbhāvāt kaivalyārthaṁ pravṛtteścha, Ibid, 17. ³ jananamaraṇakaraṇānāṁ pratiniyamād ayugapat pravṛtteścha, puruṣabahutvaṁ siddhaṁ traiguṇyaviparyayāchchaiva. pratīkṣaṇapariṇāmino hi sarvabhāvā ṛte chitiśakteḥ
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homogeneous change (sarūpa or sajātīya pariṇāma) in Prakṛti when all the three guṇas are in the state of equilibrium. It is only when heterogeneous change takes place and rajas vibrates and makes sattva and tamas vibrate that the equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes place. Sattva, the principle of manifestation and rajas, the principle of activity were formerly held in check by tamas, the principle of non-manifestation and non-activity. But when rajas, the principle of activity vibrates and makes the other two vibrate, the process of creation begins. And creation is not the new creation of the worldly objects, but only their manifestation. It is only making explicit of that which was formerly implicit. Evolution is regarded as cyclic and not linear. There is no continuous progress in one direction, but alternating periods of evolution (sarga) and dissolution (pralaya) in a cyclic order. Evolution is again said to be teleological and not mechanical or blind. Evolution takes place for serving the purpose of the Puruṣa. Prakṛti, the guṇas, the senses, the mind, the ego, the intellect, the subtle body—all are constantly serving the end of the Puruṣa. This end is either worldly experience (bhoga) or liberation (apavarga). Puruṣa needs Prakṛti for enjoyment as well as for liberation, for saṁsāra as well as for Kaivalya. Evolution supplies objects to be enjoyed to the Puruṣa and also works for his liberation by enabling him to discriminate between himself and Prakṛti.
Now the question is: How does evolution take place? Evidently when heterogeneous motion arises and rajas disturbs the equilibrium of the guṇas. But how is the equilibrium disturbed? Sāṅkhya fails to answer this question satisfactorily. The fundamental blunder of Sāṅkhya has been to separate Prakṛti and Puruṣa as absolute and independent entities. As a matter of fact, the subject and the object are two aspects of the same reality which holds them together and yet transcends them. All realistic pluralism, of whatever brand it may be, has failed to answer this question satisfactorily. If Prakṛti and Puruṣa are absolutely separate and independent entities, then they can never unite together, nor can there be any tertium quid to unite them. And if they cannot unite evolution cannot take place. Sāṅkhya says that the disturbance of the equilibrium of the guṇas which starts evolution is made possible by the contact of Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Puruṣa without Prakṛti is lame and Prakṛti without Puruṣa is blind. 'Theory without practice is empty and practice without theory is blind.' 'Concepts without percepts are empty and percepts without concepts are blind.' Prakṛti needs Puruṣa in order to be known, to be seen, to be enjoyed (darśanārtham); and Puruṣa needs Prakṛti in order to enjoy (bhoga) and also in order to obtain liberation (apavarga), in order to discriminate between himself and Prakṛti and thereby obtain emancipation (kaivalyārtham). If Prakṛti and Puruṣa remain separate, there is dissolution. For creation they must unite. Just as a lame man
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and a blind man can co-operate and the lame may sit on the shoulders of the blind and point to him the way, while the blind may walk and thus both can reach the destination, though neither of them could have done that separately, similarly the inactive Puruṣa and the non-intelligent Prakṛti co-operate to serve the end, and this union disturbs the equilibrium of the guṇas and leads to evolution.¹ But how can the two opposed and independent entities really come into contact? Sāṅkhya realizes this difficulty and in order to avoid it says that there is no real contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti and that only the proximity of the Puruṣa, only the fact that Puruṣa is near to Prakṛti (puruṣa-sannidhi-mātra), is sufficient to disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas and thus lead to evolution. But here Sāṅkhya falls into another difficulty. The Puruṣa being always near to Prakṛti (for the inactive Puruṣa cannot move), evolution should never stop and dissolution would become impossible. Evolution, then, would be beginningless and the very conception of Prakṛti as the state of equilibrium of the three guṇas would be impossible. Sāṅkhya finds itself between these two horns of a dilemma—either no contact and hence no evolution or else no equilibrium and hence no Prakṛti and no dissolution. In order to avoid these difficulties, Sāṅkhya now posits the theory of the semblance of a contact (saṁyogābhāsa). Of course, there is no real contact (saṁyoga) between Puruṣa and Prakṛti; there is the semblance of a contact and it is this semblance which leads to evolution. Puruṣa is reflected in the intellect (buddhi) and wrongly identifies himself with his own reflection in the buddhi. It is this reflection of the Puruṣa which comes into contact with Prakṛti and not the Puruṣa himself. But buddhi or mahat is regarded as the first evolute of Prakṛti and how can it arise before evolution to receive the reflection of the Puruṣa? To avoid this difficulty it is said that the Puruṣa is reflected in the Prakṛti itself. If so, then liberation and dissolution would become impossible because Prakṛti being always there and it being the essential nature of the Puruṣa to identify himself with his reflection in the Prakṛti, he would never get liberation and the very purpose for which evolution starts would get defeated. Moreover, the reflection being always there, there would be no dissolution and so no equilibrium of the guṇas and hence no Prakṛti. Again, if semblance of a contact is sufficient to disturb the equilibrium, then evolution itself becomes a semblance of evolution, an appearance only (vivarta) and no real transformation (pariṇāma) of Prakṛti. Thus we see that in order to defend the initial blunder of regarding Puruṣa and Prakṛti as absolute and independent entities, Sāṅkhya commits blunders after blunders.
¹ puruṣasya darśanārthaṁ kaivalyārthaṁ tathā pradhānasya. paṅgvandhavad ubhayor api saṁyogas tatkṛtaḥ sargaḥ, Ibid, 21.
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VI¶
THE EVOLUTES¶
THE first product of the evolution is called Mahat, the Great. It is the germ of this vast world of objects including intellect, ego and mind. It is cosmic in its nature. But it has a psychological aspect also in which it is called buddhi or intellect. Buddhi is distinguished from consciousness. Puruṣa alone is pure consciousness. Buddhi or intellect, being the evolute of Prakṛti, is material. It is made of finest matter and is thus capable of reflecting clearly the consciousness of the Puruṣa, like a wireless set capable of receiving the aerial waves. On account of the reflection of the Puruṣa in it, it becomes apparently conscious and intelligent. The senses, the mind and the ego function for buddhi or intellect which functions directly for the Puruṣa. Its functions are said to be ascertainment and decision. It arises when sattva predominates. Its original attributes are virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), detachment (vairāgya) and power (aiśvarya). When it gets vitiated by tamas, these attributes are replaced by their opposites. Memories and recollections are stored in buddhi.
Mahat produces Ahaṅkāra. It is the principle of individuation. Its function is to generate self-sense (abhimāna). It produces the notion of the 'I' and the 'mine'. It is the individual ego-sense. Puruṣa wrongly identifies himself with this ego and knows himself as the agent of actions, desirer of desires and striver for ends, and possessor and enjoyer of ideas, emotions and volitions and also of material objects. Ahaṅkāra is said to be of three kinds:
(1) Vaikārika or sāttvika, when sattva predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it produces manas and five sensory organs and five motor organs. Viewed as psychological, it produces good deeds. (2) Bhūtādi or tāmasa, when tamas predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it produces the five subtle elements (tan-mātras). Viewed as psychological, it leads to indifferent acts or to idleness and sloth. (3) Taijasa or rājasa, when rajas predominates. Viewed as cosmic, it supplies the energy by which the Sāttvika and the Tāmasa produce their respective evolutes. Viewed as psychological, it produces evil deeds.
Manas or mind which arises from the Sāttvika Ahaṅkāra is the subtle and central sense-organ. It can come into contact with the several sense-organs at the same time. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika
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School, manas is eternal and atomic and cannot come into contact with several senses simultaneously. According to Sāṅkhya, it is neither eternal nor atomic. It is made up of parts and so can come into contact with the different senses simultaneously. Sāṅkhya assigns to manas the important function of synthesizing the sense-data into determinate perceptions, passing them on to the ego, and carrying out the orders of the ego through the motor organs.
The Sāttvika Ahaṅkāra produces, besides manas, the five sensory and the five motor organs. The five sensory organs (jñānendriya) are the functions of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound. According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the five sensory organs are derived from the five gross physical elements. But according to the Sāṅkhya, the five senses are the functions of the mind and are derived from Ahaṅkāra. The five motor organs (karmendriya) are the functions of speech, prehension, movement, excretion and reproduction.
Buddhi, ahaṅkāra and manas represent the three psychological aspects of knowing, willing and feeling or cognition, conation and affection respectively. Sāṅkhya calls them material and derives them from Prakṛti. They shine through the light of the Puruṣa and are apparently conscious. All the three are called the internal organs or antaḥkaraṇa and vital breaths (prāṇas) are said to be their modifications. The five sensory and the five motor organs together are called the ten external organs or bāhyakaraṇa. These are the thirteen karaṇas or organs of the Sāṅkhya.
From the Tāmasa Ahaṅkāra arise the five subtle essences which are called Tanmātras or 'things-in-themselves'. These are the essences of sight, smell, taste, touch and sound. Unlike the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika ones, they are not derived from the gross elements. Rather the gross elements themselves arise out of these. They are neither the qualities nor the differentia of the gross elements nor the functions which are the sensory organs, but the subtle essences which produce the gross elements as well as their qualities. From the essence of sound (śabdatanmātrā) arises the element of ether (ākāśa) together with the quality of sound. From the essence of touch combined with the essence of sound, arises the element of air together with the qualities of sound and touch. From the subtle essence of colour or sight combined with those of sound and touch, arises the element of fire or light together with the qualities of sound, touch and colour. From the essence of taste combined with those of sound, touch and colour, arises the element of water together with the qualities of sound, touch, colour and taste. And lastly, from the essence of smell combined with those of sound, touch, colour and taste, arises the element of earth together with the qualities of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell.
Evolution is the play of these twenty-four principles which, together
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with the Puruṣa who is a mere spectator and outside the play of evolution, are the twenty-five categories of Sāṅkhya. Out of these twenty-five principles, the Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect; Prakṛti is only the cause and not the effect; Mahat, Ahaṅkāra and the five subtle essences are both causes and effects; while the five sensory and the five motor organs and the five gross elements and manas are effects only.¹ This may be depicted by the following table:
1. Prakṛti | ||
2. Mahat | ||
3. Ahaṅkāra | ||
4. Manas | 5-9. Sensory organs | 10-14. Motor organs |
15-19. Tan-mātrās | ||
20-24. Mahābhūtas | ||
(The 25th is the Puruṣa, untouched by this evolution) |
The evolution is teleological. Everything works to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa though unconsciously. Just as non-intelligent trees grow fruits, or water flows on account of the declivity of the soil, or iron-filings are attracted towards a magnet, or milk flows through the udders of the cow in order to nourish the calf, similarly everything unconsciously tends to serve the purpose of the Puruṣa, whether it is enjoyment or liberation.² Prakṛti is the benefactress of Puruṣa. Though Puruṣa is inactive and indifferent and devoid of qualities, yet the virtuous and the generous Prakṛti which is full of qualities and goodness ceaselessly works through various means in a spirit of detachment for the realization of the Puruṣa, without any benefit to herself.³ Prakṛti works to liberate the Puruṣa.⁴ There is immanent teleology in Prakṛti. Though Puruṣa is neither a cause nor an effect, yet relatively it is he who should be regarded as the efficient cause as well as the final cause of evolution though Sāṅkhya regards Prakṛti as both the material and the efficient cause. He is like Aristotle's God, the unmoved mover who is beyond evolution. God, the pure intelligence, like the Puruṣa, does not actively participate in evolution. He is the end towards which the creation moves. And the creation moves by His mere presence. The guṇas, which mutually differ and yet always co-operate, work like the oil, wick and flame of a lamp and illuminate the entire purpose of the Puruṣa and present it to the buddhi or the intellect.⁵ All the organs work for the realization of the Puruṣa's end and for no other end.⁶ The subtle body too works for the sake of the Puruṣa's end.⁷ Thus the whole creation unconsciously tends
¹ mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakṛtivikṛtayaḥ sapta. ṣoḍaśakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ, Ibid, 3. ² Ibid, 57. ³ Ibid, 60. ⁴ Ibid, 58. ⁵ Ibid, 36. ⁶ Ibid, 31. ⁷ Ibid, 42.
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towards the realization of the purpose of the Puruṣa. And creation will continue till all the Puruṣas are liberated. The entire evolution of Prakṛti, therefore, right from the first evolute, the Mahat, up to the last evolutes, the gross elements, is for the purpose of liberating each individual Puruṣa.¹
VII¶
BONDAGE AND LIBERATION¶
THE earthly life is full of three kinds of pain. The first kind, called ādhyātmika, is due to intra-organic psychophysical causes and includes all mental and bodily sufferings. The second, ādhibhautika, is due to extra-organic natural causes like men, beasts, birds, thorns etc. The third, ādhidaivika, is due to supernatural causes like the planets, elemental agencies, ghosts, demons etc. Wherever there are guṇas there are pains. Even the so-called pleasures lead to pain. Even the life in heaven is subject to the guṇas. The end of man is to get rid of these three kinds of pain and sufferings. Liberation means complete cessation of all sufferings which is the summum bonum, the highest end of life (Apavarga or Puruṣārtha).
Puruṣa is free and pure consciousness. It is inactive, indifferent and possesses no attributes. Really speaking, it is above time and space, merit and demerit, bondage and liberation. It is only when it mistakes its reflection in the buddhi for itself and identifies itself wrongly with the internal organ—the intellect, the ego and the mind, that it is said to be bound. It is the ego, and not the Puruṣa, which is bound. When the Puruṣa realizes its own pure nature, it gets liberated which in fact it always was. Hence bondage is due to ignorance or non-discrimination between the self and the not-self and liberation is due to right knowledge or discrimination between the self and the not-self. Liberation cannot be obtained by means of actions. Karma, good or bad or indifferent, is the function of the guṇas and leads to bondage and not to liberation. Good actions may lead to heaven and bad actions to hell but heaven and hell alike, like this worldly life, are subject to pain. It is only knowledge which leads to liberation because bondage is due to ignorance and ignorance can be removed only by knowledge.² The Jīva has to realize itself as the pure Puruṣa through discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. Actions and fruits, merits and demerits, pleasure and pain all belong to the not-self. The knowledge that 'I am not (the not-self)', that 'nothing is mine', that 'ego is unreal', when constantly meditated upon, becomes pure, incontrovertible and absolute and leads to liberation.³ Sāṅkhya
¹ Ibid, 56. ² jñānena chāpavargo viparyayād iṣyate bandhaḥ, Ibid, 44. ³ evaṁ tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ityapariśeṣam. aviparyayād viśuddhaṁ kevalam utpadyate jñānam, Ibid, 64.
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admits both Jīvanmukti and Videhamukti. The moment right knowledge dawns, the person becomes liberated here and now, even though he may be embodied due to prārabdha karma. On account of the momentum of past deeds, the body continues to exist for some time, just as the wheel of a potter goes on revolving for some time due to previous momentum even though the potter has withdrawn his hand from it. As the liberated saint, though embodied, feels no association with the body, no new karma gets accumulated as all karma loses causal energy.¹ The final and the absolute emancipation, the complete disembodied isolation automatically results after death.² Sāṅkhya liberation is a state of complete isolation, freedom from all pain, a return of the Puruṣa to its pure nature as consciousness. There is no pleasure or happiness or bliss here, for pleasure presupposes pain and is relative to it. Pleasure is the result of sattva guṇa and liberation transcends all guṇas.
Sāṅkhya believes that bondage and liberation alike are only phenomenal. The bondage of the Puruṣa is a fiction. It is only the ego, the product of Prakṛti, which is bound. And consequently it is only the ego which is liberated. Puruṣa, in its complete isolation, is untouched by bondage and liberation. If Puruṣa were really bound, it could not have obtained liberation even after hundred births, for real bondage can never be destroyed. It is Prakṛti which is bound and Prakṛti which is liberated. Īśvarakṛṣṇa frankly says: Puruṣa, therefore, is really neither bound nor is it liberated nor does it transmigrate; bondage, liberation and transmigration belong to Prakṛti in its manifold forms.³ Prakṛti binds itself with its seven forms.⁴ There is nothing finer and subtler than Prakṛti; she is so shy that she never reappears before that Puruṣa who has once 'seen' her in her true colours.⁵ Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the audience, similarly Prakṛti also retires after exhibiting herself to the Puruṣa.⁶
VIII¶
GOD¶
THE original Sāṅkhya was monistic and theistic. But the classical Sāṅkhya, perhaps under the influence of Materialism, Jainism and Early Buddhism, became atheistic. It is orthodox because it believes in the authority of the Veda. It does not establish the non-existence of God. It only shows that Prakṛti and Puruṣas are sufficient to explain this universe and therefore there is no reason for postulating a hypothesis of God. But some commentators have tried to repudiate the existence of
¹ Ibid, 67. ² Ibid, 68. ³ tasmān na badhyate'ddhā na muchyate nāpi saṁsarati kaśchid. saṁsarati badhyate muchyate cha nānāśrayā prakṛtiḥ, Ibid, 62. ⁴ Ibid, 63. ⁵ Prakṛteḥ sukumārataraṁ na kiñchidastīti me matir bhavati. yā dṛṣṭāsmīti punar na darśanam upaiti puruṣasya, Ibid, 61. ⁶ Ibid, 59.
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God, while the later Sāṅkhya writers like Vijñānabhikṣu have tried to revive the necessity for admitting God. Those who repudiate the existence of God give the following arguments: if God is affected by selfish motives, He is not free; if He is free, He will not create this world of pain and misery. Either God is unjust and cruel or He is not free and all-powerful. If He is determined by the law of Karma, He is not free; if not, He is a tyrant. Again, God being pure knowledge, this material world cannot spring from Him. The effects are implicitly contained in their cause and the material world which is subject to change requires an unintelligent and ever-changing cause and not a spiritual and immutable God. Again, the eternal existence of the Puruṣas is inconsistent with God. If they are the parts of God, they must have some divine power. If they are created by God, they are subject to destruction. Hence there is no God.
IX¶
GENERAL ESTIMATE¶
LET us now proceed to give a critical estimate of the Sāṅkhya system. The logic of the Sāṅkhya system, like that of Jainism, impels it to embrace idealistic monism or absolutism but it clings, like Jainism, to spiritualistic pluralism and dualistic realism. The fundamental blunder of Sāṅkhya is to treat Prakṛti and Puruṣa as absolutely separate and independent realities. The Prakṛti and Puruṣa of Sāṅkhya thus become mere abstractions torn away from the context of concrete experience. The object and the subject are relative and not independent and absolute. Experience always unfolds them together. Like the two sides of the same coin, they are the two aspects of the same reality. To dig a chasm between them is to undermine them both. And that is what Sāṅkhya has done. The logic of Sāṅkhya requires it to maintain the ultimate reality of the transcendental Puruṣa alone and to regard Prakṛti as its inseparable power. When this Puruṣa is reflected in its own power Prakṛti, it becomes the empirical ego, the Jīva, the phenomenal. Plurality belongs to this Jīva, not to the transcendental Puruṣa. The subject and the object, the Jīva and the Prakṛti, are the two aspects of the Puruṣa which is their transcendental background. It is the Puruṣa which sustains the empirical dualism between Prakṛti and Jīva and which finally transcends it. Every Jīva is the potential Puruṣa and liberation consists in the actualization of this potentiality. This is the philosophy to which the Sāṅkhya logic points and which is throughout implicit in Sāṅkhya, but which is explicitly rejected by Sāṅkhya with the inevitable and unfortunate result that Sāṅkhya has reduced itself to a bundle of contradictions. If Prakṛti and Puruṣa are absolute and independent, they can never come into contact and hence there can be no evolution at all. As